ESQUEMA (P) 15
M. Verónica Arís Zlatar
II. MEDITATIONEN
FREILEGUNG
DES TRANSZENDENTALEN ERFAHRUNGSFELDES NACH SEINEN UNIVERSALEN STRUKTUREN
SECOND MEDITATION
THE FIELD OF
TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE LAID OPEN IN RESPECT OF ITS UNIVERSAL STRUCTURES
Translated by Dorion
Cairns
SEGUNDA MEDITACIÓN
DESCUBRIMIENTO DEL CAMPO
TRASCENDENTAL DE LA EXPERIENCIA SEGÚN SUS ESTRUCTURAS UNIVERSALES
Tranducido por Mario
A. Presas
(§§12-22)
§15 Natural and transcendental reflection (pp.
33-37)
§15 Natürliche
und transzendentale Reflexion (pp. 35-39)
§15 Reflexión
natural y reflexión trascendental (pp. 47-52)
P1 The grasping of transcendental reflection as
an special alteration of the original living experience which does not lack anything
relevant about the modality of consciousness because its abstaining is a
transcendental affair
P2 The natural ego as “interested” in the world
and the transcendental ego as “disinterested onlooker” above the naïve
interested ego. Then the sole remaining interest is to see and to describe
adequately what he sees
P3 The universal description possible
by transcendental reflection is the foundation for a radical and universal
criticism
P4 Two correlatives sides of the universal
description: (i) the noematic
description which regard to the intentional object as such, and, (ii) the noetic description which concerns the
modes of cogito or consciousness
P5 The transcendental reflection does not lose
the world, conversely, retains it qua
cogitatum by its correlatives modes of consciousness
P1
The grasping of transcendental
reflection as an special alteration of the original living experience which
does not lack anything relevant about the modality of consciousness because its
abstaining is a transcendental affair
Distinction
between acts that are fulfilled in the executed straightforward grasping and
the acts that opens those acts straightforward:
“(…) we must distinguish
“straightforwardly” executed grasping perceiving, remembering, predicating,
valuing, purposing, etc., from the reflections by means of which alone, as
grasping acts belonging to a new level, the straightforward acts become
accessible to us.” / “(…), dass wir unterscheiden
müssen das “geradehin” vollzogene erfassende Wahrnehmen, Scherinnern,
Prädizieren, Werten, Zwecksetzen usw. von den Reflexionen, durch die sich, als
erfassenden Akten einer neuen Stufe, uns eben die Aktegeradehin erst
erschliessen.” / “(…) debemos distinguir, por una parte, el percibir, el
recorder, el predicar, el valorar, el proponerse fines, etcetera, como actos
que se cumplen en una aprehensión directa, y, por otra parte, las reflexiones
por medio de las cuales únicamente, en cuanto actos aprehensivos de un nuevo
grado,, se nos revelan precisamente aquellos actos de modo directo.”
My
additions:
The epistemological arising of phenomenological “seeing” and “givennes”
“Every intellectual process and indeed every
mental process whatever, while being enacted, can be made the object of a pure
“seeing” and understanding, and is something absolutely given in this “seeing.”
It is given as something that is, that is here and now, and whose being cannot
be sensibly doubted.” (Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology. Translated by
William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.
Lecture II, p. 24).
The behavior in front of this being enacted:
“To be sure, I can wonder what
sort of being this is and how this mode of being is related to other modes” (Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology. Translated by William P. Alston and
George Nakhnikian. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. Lecture II, p. 24).
This behavior becomes a special task:
“It
is true I can wonder what givenness means here, and reflecting further I can
“see” the “seeing” itself in which this givenness, or this mode of being, is
constituted.” (Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology. Translated by
William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.
Lecture II, p. 24).
Natural
reflection and psychological reflection have in common that we are over the
base of the world already given as existing:
“In the “natural reflection” of
everyday life, also however in that psychological science (that is, in
psychological experience of our own psychic processes), we stand on the footing
of the world already given as existing” / “In der
natüralichen Reflexion des Alltagslebens, aber auch der psychologischen Wissenschaft
(also der psychologischen Erfahrung von den eigenen psuchischen Erlebnissen),
stehen wir auf dem Boden der als seined vorgegebenen Welt;” / “En la reflexión
natural de la vida cotidiana, pero también en la ciencia psicológica (o sea, en
la experiencia psicológica de nuetsras propias vivencias) estamos sobre la base
del mundo ya dado como existente.”
General
definition of phenomenological transcendental reflection:
“In transcendental-phenomenological
reflection we deliver ourselves from this footing, by universal epoché with
respect to the being or non-being of the world.” / “In der
transzendental-phänomenologischen Reflexion entheben wir uns dieses Bodens
durch die universal epoché hinsichtlich des Seins oder Nichtseins der Welt.” / “En la reflexión
fenomenológica trascendental abandonamos ese terreno, practicando la epoché
universal respecto del ser o no-ser del mundo.”
My
comments:
This
passage is very important if we take a look the paragraph 23, the first one of
the next meditation. There we are going to see in which way the being or
non-being of the world, despite its disconnection, is central for the system of
verification and for evidence in general.
The
modification of the experience to get the transcendental experience:
“The experience as thus modified, the transcendental experience, consists
then, we can say, in our looking at and describing the particular
transcendentally reduced cogito, but without participating, as reflective
subjects, in the natural existence-positing that the originally straightforward
perception (or the cogito) contains or that the Ego, as immersing himself
straightforwardly in the world, actually executed.” / “Die so modifizierte, die
transzendentale Erfahrung besteht dann, können wir sagen, darin, dass wir uns
das jeweilige transzendental reduzierte cogito ansehen und es beschreiben, aber
ohne als reflektierende Subjekte die natürliche Seinssetzung mitzuvollziehen,
die die ursprünglich geradehin vollzogene Wahrnehmung oder das sonstige cogito
in sich enthält bzw. die das geradehin in die Welt hineinlebende Ich wirklich
vollzogen hatte.” / “La experiencia así modificada, o sea, la experiencia
trascendental consiste entonces, podemos decir, en el hecho de contemplar el
cogito ya reducido trascendentalmente y en describirlo, pero sin que nosotros,
en cuanto sujetos que reflexionan, co-ejecutemos la posición natural del ser
que está contenida en la percepción originariamente llevada a cabo de modo
directo (o en cualquier otro cogito), posición que el yo había llevado a cabo
efectivamente al vivir de modo directo inmerso en el mundo.”
My
comments:
Here
the rejection of any co-execution of the existence-positing in the phenomenological
reflection is, from my point of view, the requirement to practicing
phenomenology and to not fail in any metaphysical explanation of the origin of
our intentional way of living. If we attend to the question of “how does appear
what is appearing”, we have the key to be safe of the irresistible tendency to
turn to questions as: why, for what, etc. Then, the central thing is that in
the progress of the givenness there is the tendency to dogmatize what is
appearing. To resolve this, we have to be aware to keep our seeing free of any
existence-positing, or as it is also so-called “dogmatism” or “interpretative
construction”. However, someone can ask here if in this way we are presupposing
the appearing as unlimited and consequently if there is a pre-conception of the
consciousness as unlimited. In this case, from my point of view, I have to say
that is not merely a presupposition, or what we can consider as a presupposition
here in this text must count for us only as an advice, because in practical
terms it must be considered as a respect disposition before the huge and
unspeakable multiplicity that appears, that is given. Only from this
disposition -that we will see soon as “disinterested”- we can let the things be
given as they are given.
My
additions:
If we want to ask why, we have to consider the transcendental reflection
as Phenomenological experience:
“Phenomenological experience
as reflection must avoid any interpretative construction. Its descriptions must
reflect accurately the concrete contents of experience, precisely as these are
experienced” (Husserl, The Paris Lectures, p. 13).
The
possible acceptance of Heidegger’s impugnation against transcendental-phenomenological
reflection in Prolegomena:
“Therewith, to be sure, an
essentially changed subjective process takes the place of the original one;
accordingly it must be said that this reflection alters the original subjective process.” /
“Damit tritt allerdings an Stelle des ursprünglichen Erlebnisses ein wesentlich
anderes; insofern ist also zu sagen, die Reflexion verändere das ursprüngliche
Erlebnise.” / “Así, en lugar de la experiencia originaria se presenta, ciertamente,
otra esencialmente distinta; y en tal medida, por tanto, hay que decir que la
reflexión altera la vivencia originaria.”
Presentation
of the irresoluble problem of every reflection possible, and in this way, every
possibility of philosophical explanations and descriptions (included the formal
indication of the hermeneutical phenomenology of Heidegger):
“But that is true of every reflection, including natural reflection.” / “Aber das gilt für jede, auch für
die natürliche Reflexion.” / “Pero esto es válido para toda reflexión, incluso
para la reflexión natural.”
The
relevant aspect of reflection in general (phenomenological, hermeneutical,
psychological, natural), beyond the pretention to keep the naïve originality of
the natural experience:
“The proper task of reflection,
however, is not to repeat the original process, / but to consider it and
explicate what can be found in it” / “Doch ist es nicht die
Aufgabe der Reflexion, das ursprüngliche Erlebnise zu wiederholen, sondern es
zu betrachten und auszulegen, was in ihm vorfindlich ist.” / “Sin embargo, la
tarea de la reflexión no consiste, por cierto, en repetir la vivencia
originaria, sino en considerarla y en explicitar lo que en ella se encuentra.”
The
intentional task of the intentional analysis, proper of
transcendental-phenomenological reflection:
“Naturally the transition to this
considering yields a new intentional process, which, with its peculiarity of “relating
back to the earlier process”, is awareness, and perhaps evident awareness, of
just that earlier process itself, and not some other” /
“Natürlich liefert der Übergang in dieses Betrachten ein neues intentionales
Erlebnis, das in seiner intentionalen Eigenheit “Rückbeziehung auf das frühere
Erlebnis” eben dieses selbst, und nicht ein anderes, bewusst und eventuell
evident bewusst macht.” / “Naturalmente, el tránsito de esa consideración
procura una nueva vivencia intencional que, en virtud de su propiedad
intencional de ser referencia a la
vivencia anterior, hace consciente, y eventualmente hace consciente de modo
evidente, justamente esa misma evidencia y no otra.”
The
belonging of the non-participating:
“The
non-participating, the abstaining, of the Ego who has the phenomenological
attitude is his affair” / “Das
Nicht-Mitmachen, Sich-Enthalten des phänomenologisch eingestellten Ich ist
seine Sache” / “El no-coejecutar, el abstenerse del yo en la actitud fenomenológica,
es cosa suya”.
My
comments:
This
passage is only understandable in coordination with the paragraph 23. The
certain thesis of reality belongs to the sphere of evidence and its
verification system as a moment whose quality has to be studied in this high level.
P2
The natural ego as “interested” in
the world and the transcendental ego as “disinterested onlooker” above the
naïve interested ego. Then the sole remaining interest is to see and to
describe adequately what he sees
The
splitting of the Ego:
“(…), then the phenomenologically
altered –and, as so altered, continually maintained- attitude consists in a
splitting of the Ego [Ichspaltung]:” / “so
besteht die phänomenologisch geänderte und beständig so festgehaltene
einstellung darin, dass sich eine Ichspaltung vollzieht,” / “la actitud
modificada fenomenologicamente y constantemente mantenida en su modificación,
consiste en el hecho de que se produce una escisión en el yo,”.
My
comments:
The
splitting of the Ego, talks about the natural, particular ego. We have to see
that it is an Ichspaltung and not an Egospaltung. However, there is a
splitting when we proceed by phenomenological reduction. What kind of splitting
it is?
From
my point of view, the splitting concerns to the arising of the universal dimension
of transcendental ego, whose character is unworldly.
The
universal dimension of transcendental ego is not a worldly experience, and in
this way we can say that transcendental ego is a counter-pole of the world, and
not a residue of the world.
We
can discuss here why Husserl talks about transcendental experience if transcendental
ego is not part of world experience. Can we talk about experience without
world, without constitution?
My
additions:
Here we can take into account the
passage of Fink where he explains the problem if there is a constitution in the
transcendental field in contrast with the task of the theory of elements which
studies the constitution of the world. This passage can also be considered to
discuss the paragraph 18 of Cartesian
Meditations regarding the kind of identity of these different egos:
“But
is this uncovering of the
being-tendency (enworlding) of all constituting life itself caught up in the being-tendency? Does
phenomenologizing uncover “something existent”? Or, rather, [does
phenomenologizing uncover] precisely the
becoming of being (of the world) in
the processes of constitutive formation-in-being, which are themselves not “existent”,
at least not “existent in the sense of worldly being,” for worldly being is in
principle the end-product of
processes of constitutive performance? Is the reflective thematizing of
constitutive becoming something different
in principle, something different in its intentional experiential sense,
from the reflective thematizing of “immanent being”? The reflection that is constitutively clarified in the
transcendental theory of elements is human self-experience (experience of “immanent
being”)- only precisely transcendentally reduced. This reflection, having lost
its humanness by the epoché, stands in
the being-tendency; the constitutive interrogation of that very tendency
brings into light the implied realm of hidden constituting life.
“But
is this activity of constitutive
interrogation and clarification,
the uncovering of constitution, itself a “constituting” act? And is reflection upon this activity a
reflection upon “something existent” or upon the sort of something that at
least stands in the constituting tendency toward being, in the finality of world-actualization? Does
reflectively turning back upon phenomenologizing have the same act-intentional
structure and the same “constitutive essence” as reflection that is clarified
thematically in the transcendental theory of elements (as an occurrence in the
transcendentally reduced stream of experience [Erlebnisstrom]?
“In
these questions is found formulated the problem
of the transcendental theory of method. In the dualism of transcendental life (i.e., transcendentally constitutive
life and phenomenologizing life!) lies the basis for the problematic of
transcendental self-reference –and not, as with psychology, in the monism of psychic being” (Fink, Sixth Cartesian Meditation, pp. 21-22).
In some passage after the last one Fink
says:
“The
self-dividing of transcendental life –in the phenomenological reduction- does
not, however, annul its unity, which overarches this internal self-opposition” (Fink, Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p. 24).
P3
The universal description possible by transcendental reflection is the
foundation for a radical and universal criticism
The
restriction to the pure data:
“That signifies restriction to the pure data of transcendental
reflection, which therefore must be taken precisely as they are given in simple
evidence, purely “intuitively”, and always kept free from all interpretations
that read into them more than is genuinely seen.” / “Das besagt
Bindung an die puren Gegebenheiten der transzendentalen Reflexion, die also
genau so, wie sie sich in der schlichten Evidenz rein “intuitive” geben,
genommen warden und von allen Hineindeutungen über das rein Geschaute
freigehalten bleiben müssen.” / “Esto significa, por tanto, sujeción a los
datos puros de la reflexión trascendental, los cuales tienen que ser tomados
exactamente tal como se dan de modo puramente intuitive en la simple evidencia
y han de permanecer libres de toda interpretación que vaya más allá de lo
puramente visto.”
My
comments:
The
discussion concerning the phenomenological data is going to take place in the
next paragraph, in contrast with the empirical data and also the dogmatic
structural data of psychological theories.
P4
Two correlatives sides of the
universal description: (i) the noematic
description which regard to the intentional object as such, and, (ii) the noetic description which concerns the
modes of cogito or consciousness
P5
The transcendental reflection does
not lose the world, conversely, retains it qua
cogitatum by its correlatives modes of consciousness
M. Verónica Arís Zlatar
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