Verónica Arís Zlatar
Translated by Dorion Cairns
Tranducido por Mario A. Presas
§14      The stream of cogitationes. Cogito and cogitatum (pp. 31-33)
§14      Der Strom der cogitationes. Cogito und cogitatum (pp. 33-35)
§14      La corriente de las “cogitaciones”. “Cogito” y “cogitatum” (pp. 45-47)
P1   The transcendental evidence of the ego cogito in view of the manifold of cogitationes
P2   What kind of relation has phenomenological description with psychological description?
P3   Epoché does not change the correlation between cogitationes and cogitata
The transcendental evidence of the ego cogito in view of the manifold of cogitationes
Husserl´s invitation to turn toward the manifold of cogitationes:
“We now shift the weight of transcendental evidence of the ego cogito (this word taken in the broadest Cartesian sense) from the identical ego to the manifold cogitationes, the flowing conscious life in which the identical Ego (mine, the meditor’s) lives” / “Das Schwergewicht der transzendentalen Evidenz des ego cogito (dieses Wort im weitesten Cartesianischen Sinne genommen) verlegen wir jetzt […] vom identischen Ego auf die mannigfaltigen cogitationes, also auf das strömende Bewusstseinsleben, in dem das identische Ich (meine, des Meditierenden) lebt” / “Vamos ahora a trasladar el peso de la evidencia trascendental del ego cogito (tomando esta expression en el más amplio sentido cartesiano) desde el ego idéntico a las multiples cogitationes, es decir, a la vida fluyente de la conciencia en la cual vive el yo idéntico (el mío, el de quien medita)”.
My comment: The evidence is the guideline of this second meditation. According to it, as how appear what is appearing, we can look at the constituted unity of meaning/sense (noema), or to the various cogitations that are acting in the constitution (noesis), or we can see how the ego is part of this complex acting/functioning. Here the invitation is to look at the noesis.
What kind of relation has phenomenological description with psychological description?
First question of Husserl:
“It would be much too great a mistake, if one said that to follow this line of research is nothing else than to make psychological descriptions based on purely internal experience” / “Man wird vielleicht sagen, dieser Forschungsrichtung folgen, sei nichts anderes als psychologische Deskription auf dem Grunde rein innerer Erfahrung,” / “Se dirá, quizá, que seguir tal dirección en las investigaciones no es otra cosa que ejecutar una descripción psicológica basada en la experiencia puramente interior”.
My additions for the paragraph:
We can remember the passage of the paragraph 11: “The psychic life that psychology talks about has in fact always been, and still is, meant as psychic life in the world. Obviously the same is true also of one’s own psychic life, which is grasped and considered in purely internal experience.”
We can anticipate the passage of the paragraph 16: “As already mentioned, the parallel to this transcendental uncovering is the psychological uncovering of myself, i.e., my purely psychic being and, first of all, my psychic life, apperceived in the natural manner, namely as a component of my psychophysical (animal) reality and thus as a component of the world I naturally accept.”
We can also anticipate the passage of the paragraph 61: “But intentional psychology already has the transcendental hiddenly within itself; only a final clarification of its sense is needed in order to make the Copernican shift, which does not change the content of psychology’s intentional results but only leads back to its “ultimate sense”. Psychology has just one fundamental problem, which (it may be objected) is ultimately a problem of fundamentals, albeit the only one: the concept of the psyche.”
Why not:
“(…) a purely descriptive psychology of consciousness (…) is not itself transcendental phenomenology as we have defined the latter, in terms of the transcendental phenomenological reduction” / “Indessen, eine rein descriptive Bewusstseinspsychologie, (…), ist nicht selbst transzendentale Phänomenologie in dem Sinne, wie wir sie durch die transzendental-phänomenologische Reduktion bestimmt haben.” / “Sin embargo, una psicología puramente descriptive de la conciencia –(…)- no es ella misma fenomenología trascendental en el sentido en que la hemos determinado por medio de la reducción fenomenológica trascendental.”
Parallel between pure psychology and transcendental phenomenology:
“To be sure, pure psychology of consciousness is a precise parallel to transcendental phenomenology of consciousness” / “Zwar ist reine Bewusstseinpsychologie eine genaue Paralele zur transzendentalen Bewusstseinphänomenologie,” / “Es verdad que una psicología pura de la conciencia es un paralelo exacto de la fenomenología trascendental de la conciencia”.
Transcendental reduction is not an abstractive restricting:
“It must be continually borne in mind that all transcendental phenomenological research is inseparable from undeviating observance of the transcendental reduction, which must not be confounded with the abstractive restricting of anthropological research to purely psychic life.” / “Es ist immerfort zu beachten, dass die gesamte transzendental-phänomenologische Forschung an die unverbrüchliche Innehaltung der transzedentalen Reduktion gebunden ist, die nicht verwechselt warden darf mit der abstraktiven Beschränkung anthropologischer Forschung auf das blosse Seelenleben.” / “Hay que atender de continuo al hecho de que la entera investigación fenomenológica trascendental está ligada a la inviolable observancia de la redcción trascendental, la cual no debe ser confundida con la limitación abstractiva, propia de la investigación antropológica, a la mera vida psíquica.”
The data for psychology:
“In the one case we have data belonging to the world, which is presupposed as existing –that is to say, data taken as psychic components of a man.” / “Einmal haben wir Daten der als seined vorausgesetzten Welt, nämlich aufgefasst als seelische Bestände des Menschen,” / “En un caso, tenemos datos del mundo presupuesto como existente, es decir, datos concebidos como components psíquicos del hombre.”
The data for phenomenology:
“In the other case (…) the whole world (…) is not accepted as actuality, but only as an actuality-phenomenon.” / “(…) das andere Mal (…) die Welt überhaupt (…) nicht in Geltung ist als Wirklichkeit, sondern nur als Wirklichkeitphänomen.” / “En el otro caso, (…) el mundo en general, no está en vigor como realidad efectiva, sino tan solo como fenómeno de realidad.”
My comments: Eventually, we can think as well that we know the transcendence of the world, as existent in itself, by a psychological consciousness. In this way before epoché we can be holding a gnoseological psychologism. However, the evidence of cogito does not depend on psychological mediation.
With the distinction between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology, there are also other distinctions related:
i)                    Natural and transcendental reflection.
ii)                  Psychological and transcendental noema.
iii)                Psychology of reason and phenomenology of reason.
iv)                Natural ego, transcendental ego and transcendental onlooker.
Epoché does not change the correlation between cogitatio and cogitata
Epoché does not change the correlation:
“(…) epoché with respect to all worldly being does not at all change the fact that the manifold cogitationes relating to what is worldly bear this relation within themselves,” / “(…) dass die epoché hinsichtlich alles weltlichen Seins daran nichts ändert, dass die mannigfaltigen cogitationes, die sich auf Weltliches beziehen, in sich selbst diese Beziehung tragen,” / “(…) la epojé respect de todo ser mundanal nada altera en el hecho de que las múltiples cogitationes que se refieren a lo mundanal, lleven en sí mismas dicha referencia”.
Correlation between cogito and cogitatum:
“Each cogito, each conscious process, we may also say, “meanssomething or other and bears in itself, in this manner peculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum. Each does this, moreover, in its own fashion.” / “Jedes cogito, jedes Bewusstseinserlebnis, so sagen wir auch, meint irgend etwas und trägt in dieser Weise des Gemeinten in sich selbst sein jeweiliges cogitatum, und jedes tut das in seiner Weiser.” / “(…) todo cogito, o como también decimos, toda vivencia de la conciencia mienta algo y lleva en sí mismo su respective cogitatum en ese modo de lo mentado, y cada uno lo hace a su modo.”
Definition of intentionality:
“(…) this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of something; as a cogito, to bear within itself its cogitatum.” / “(…) diese allgemeine Grundeigenschaft des Bewusstseins, Bewusstsein von etwas zu sein, als cogito sein cogitatum in sich zu tragen” / “(…) esa propiedad universal y fundamental de la conciencia de ser conciencia de algo, de llevar en sí misma, en cuanto cogito, su cogitatum.”
Verónica Arís Zlatar


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