01 Before phenomenology in epistemological way





M. Verónica Arís Zlatar
According to the field of:
Natural World / Natural attitude / Unstable position for knowledge
I.                   The previous stage of phenomenology:
Epistemological necessity of the new ground of evidence
§1        The problem of knowledge.
a)      What does knowledge is? Is it possible to know? Which is the consequence of the radical impossibility to anticipate the experience rightly? Is it possible to overcome the skeptical position of Hume, for example?
b)      Is it possible to know about knowledge, or inclusive consider that we do not know, if we doubt with radicalism its possibility? Is reasonable this regressus ad infinitum of the so called Theory of Knowledge for knowledge in general? Are we misunderstanding something?
c)      Is every mention a kind of knowledge? How can we distinct kinds of knowledge? What do the empirical knowledge, the pure knowledge and the a priori knowledge consist on? Which kind of method requires each field of knowledge?
d)     Is the eidetic influence a right solution to understand the validity of our knowledge? What is the problem of the eidetic influence, for example, the mathematical influence? Which was the problem of Kant’s transcendental philosophy according to Newton and Euclides?
e)      In which way takes place the ‘evil demons/genius’ in the Metaphysical Meditations by Descartes?
§2        Knowledge and judgment
a)      Which is the relation between things/objects of knowledge, knowing itself and propositions?
b)      What kind of system for knowledge establishes the validity of one proposition? How vulnerable is the situation of the proposition? Which factors have we to consider for it?
c)      What are we saying when we express a proposition? How many propositions are implicated in it without any change on the meaning? What kind of variation we can do, ontological or grammatical ones, or both?
d)     In which sense categories and divisions (genus et species) take place here?
e)      Which is the inner relation between them? Are they independent or not independent? Following Carl Stumpf.
§3        Acts for knowledge
a)      Which is the ground of knowledge? Is it the living experience in general?
b)      In that case, is the living experience as extensive as the possibility of meaning?
c)      Is the subjective position for knowledge relevant to determine the validity of a proposition? Is the subjective consideration a psychologismus? Is there another way to consider subjectivity to be free of any psychologismus?
d)     How can we determine the acts for knowledge? Are they some sort of collection? What are we doing when we are attending to something or saying a proposition?
e)      Which are the properties of the acts for knowledge that we can distinct?
f)       Which is the principle which rules every experience possible?
§4        The best knowledge possible
a)      Is there some kind of guiding idea of what is our best possibility for knowledge? Which is it? Why does it is considered the best? Is science the factual example of this guiding idea?
b)      Which is the field of evidence? By which way the evidence of cogito can help us to understand every possibility for knowledge?
c)      Is it possible to get evidence for every mention possible? What we can expect of our understanding in a broad sense?
d)     By which way we can consider the grade for knowledge of what we are proposing in each case?
§5        The requirements for a phenomenological theory of knowledge
a)      Distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. How can we recognize the authentic presentation of something? Discussion attending the authenticity and inauthenticity of vorstellung in Franz Brentano as erscheinen.
b)      Respecting the subjectivity as such. How can we talk about the possible conditions for knowledge without the common betraying subjectivity and respecting it as subjective life? How can we keep alive/vivid the living experience through the theoretical task? Discussion attending the deconstructive and reconstructive task in Paul Natorp.
c)      Considering the functional structure of knowledge possible as a constrictive pure Logic, including every deductive theory of multiplicity, either actual or possible: Is plausible to find some accordance or constant in every particular science? Is possible to examine this constant as the structure of knowledge possible? Which is the form of this constant? Is this constant a constant for itself? How this structure can be rightly grounded?


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